After deliberating on these three components of 'speech act', Strawson conveyed that the distinction between the first and the second component is redundant, because one integrates with the other. So according to him, there are two types of act, and placed in two levels.

1. Perlocutionary acts
2. Mixing acts

He submitted that these two levels are not inalienable from each other.

With these analyses, he moved a step forward and conveyed that these two levels come under one head, i.e. "The principle of expressibility". Meaning is assimilating with 'force' (tone) because of the principle of expressibility. "The principle of expressibility" expresses that whatever can be meant can be said". For him, "said" means "act". It implies the illocutionary act. The illocutionary act does not perform arbitrarily. They are governed and regulated by certain grammatical rules and regulations (conventions).

There are two rules invariably found in illocutionary acts. These are;

1. Constitutive rule
2. Regulative rule

Regulative rules are characterized as moral rules or can be paraphrased as imperatives. For example; "While cutting fruits you should hold the knife in your right hand", "Army officers need to wear tie at dinner". But constitutive rules are not merely presented in the form of imperatives, rather they regulate the imperative norms, and further create new forms of behavior. For example; the rules of football. In this case, we do not merely regulate the game of football but define that activity. Acting in accordance with these rules constitutes the activity of playing football. Football game has no existence apart from these rules. Thus for him, constitutive rules are more important than regulative rules.

In this context, John Searle (1969) mentioned nine conditions⁷ for fulfilling the 'promising' acts. Out of all four are significant for our purpose those are placed below.

1. The speaker should not be under duress (pressure).
2. The speaker must have a desire to express the proposition, and indeed expressing the proposition.
3. By expressing the proposition the speaker has announced the future acts.
4. While expressing the proposition the sincerity condition should be met.

In the fourth condition, 'promise' is made with sincerity. The reason is in this condition the speaker is intended to keep his/her promise sincerely. Thus, on the view of Austin without these conditions the promise can't be considered as 'promise'.

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7	Searle, J.R. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.60, 63, 64, and 65.