Module 4 : EARLY WITTGENSTEIN

Presentation - 09

 

  1. The internal relation between the proposition and the situation can be shown but cannot be stated
  2. Something can be said if and only if the hearer could grasp the content of what it is being stated. From this, it is asserted that internal relation is one that cannot be stated. This is so because the internal relationship between a proposition and the situation though made by the individual yet the individual is independent from it. In a sense, the internal relationship is not possessed by the individual. It confines to the objects only. Bringing the distinction between two occurrences 'showing' and 'stating' Wittgenstein explains that stating consists in 'referring' and 'describing', and they are not found in the case of an internal relation between the proposition and the situation that it describes, whereas showing consists in 'representing' and 'arranging', and this expounds the internal relation between the proposition and the situation that it describes. Further, in the case of 'showing' both representing and arranging occur simultaneously, whereas in the case of 'stating', describing follows from referring and vice versa. From this, it is argued that the internal relation between a proposition and the situation that it describes can be shown only, but cannot be stated. Hence, a proposition represents a particular situation.


  3. Truth-value of a sentence is determined from the process of comparison between the proposition and the reality
  4. There is no way of finding out from the proposition itself that it is true or false. In order to get the truth-value of a proposition we must compare the proposition with the reality. It is assumed that unless a proposition were a picture we would not know where to link it to the world in order to verify the proposition (Notebooks, 8). Thus, if a proposition corresponds to the reality then it is true and if does not correspond to the reality then it is false.


  5. Propositions exist independent of reality
  6. Each proposition does not necessarily express the actual state of affairs but they may state the possible states of affairs. Though a proposition expresses a state of affairs which is about the world yet they are not one and the same. A reality consists of existing and non- existing states of affairs. Every proposition depicts a picture. A picture represents something independently of its truth or falsity. More to say, a proposition acquires a sense when it depicts a picture. The mere proposition which is the outcome of the concatenation of certain words does not state anything. It states when we make a relation between the sense of a proposition or the picture of a proposition with the facts or state of affairs of the world.


  7. No proposition is true a priori
  8. A proposition is true a priori when the truth of that proposition is recognized independent of reality. According to Wittgenstein this is impalpable and implausible. It is so because every proposition expresses a state of affairs. The truth-value of a proposition is determined when there will be a comparison between the proposition and the state of affairs of the world that the proposition is stating about. In this regard, Wittgenstein states that "in order for a proposition to be capable of being true it must also be capable of being false" (Notebooks, 55). All the genuine propositions are contingent propositions. The logical propositions which are counted as a priori can be seen to be true symbols alone, this shows they are only proposition by courtesy (Notebooks, 127). So, they are not counted as propositions in true sense of the term.