Wittgenstein states that a proposition is a picture, and it depicts the facts that it describes (Kennay,1973,62). In order to establish this, i.e., "a proposition is a picture of the fact" he has given the following arguments:
- A proposition is essentially composite
- The correlation of the elements of a proposition
- Non-arbitrary representation of a proposition
- The intrinsic relation between the proposition and the situation it describes
A proposition is the result of the combination of a string of words conveying a specific meaning. But any combination of words does not constitute a sentence. For example, "cow flies hinge duster". In this sentence all the constituent words are not used in a determinate way. So it does not convey any specific meaning. In this regard, Wittgenstein states that "a mere set of names cannot express a sense" (Notebooks, 105). It is marked that a proposition unlike a name must have parts and the parts of a sentence must have a specific meaning in the context of a sentence. We regard meaning of a proposition is same as the sense of a proposition and also it is same with the picture of a proposition. From this, we can infer that every sentence depicts a picture and sentences are essentially composite in their nature.
The correlation of the elements of a proposition should be affixed in an appropriate way otherwise it does not convey any specific meaning. For example, "Horse duster green click is circle". This sentence does not possess any specific meaning because the elements of the proposition are not correlated with each other in a determinate way. A proposition however is not just a set of names; in addition to that we have to correlate the names with objects. We have to make a relationship between the names in a proposition and the objects that they designate.4
A proposition represents the situation that it describes. The correlation of names and objects expressed in a proposition is arbitrary and thus this relationship is considered to be conventional. Once a convention is established we do not need any further convention to justify it. This is how it is possible to understand a proposition which has not been previously heard.
Since a proposition depicts a situation, it must intrinsically and essentially link with the proposition. The linkage between the proposition and the situation it describes is a logical one, i.e., the logical picture. Every proposition endowed with two features, essential and accidental. Accidental features are resulted from the arbitrary conventions of the particular language to which it belongs whereas the essential features are those without which propositions could not express their sense (Tractatus, 3.34). The relation between the proposition and the situation is neither causal nor reliant but an internal one. In this regard, Wittgenstein states that internal relation is one which is unexplainable. What we explain is the relation between the two, i.e. between the proposition and the situation that it describes. But the internal relation as such however we explain it cannot be an accurate and exact explanation. Hence, our explanation of it will be approximate. In this sense, it is stated that though the internal relation is known to the speaker yet it is independent from the speaker. This is because the internal relation exists between the two objects only. Thus, it is asserted that the internal and essential property of a proposition is same as the logical structure of a proposition. Hence, a proposition describes the reality through its internal properties (Tractatus, 4.023).
| 4 | This idea has borrowed from Kennay, A. (1973). Wittgenstein. England: Penguin, p.65. |