Sense of a proposition is same as the thought of that proposition. On this account Frege aptly expresses that "the thought is not the subjective performance of thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the common property of several thinkers" (Frege, 1952,62). Here, Frege means that though thoughts on a particular fact varies from person to person yet there are some objectivity involved with it to understand the fact as the same, which Frege calls the objectivity of thought. So for him, thought of a sentence is objective and eternal. Considering this analysis it is marked that the sense of a proposition is thus a strange kind of objective entity which is apprehended by the several speaker's mind. So every sentence forms some kind of pictures in our mind. As a result we understand the situation what the sentence is stating about. If the situation correctly maps with the stating of fact then the sentence is true and if does not correctly map then it is false. Here, Wittgenstein states that the sense of a proposition is the situation it describes. The situation is itself a picture. This picture is a kind of logical picture. In his words, "What a picture represents is its sense" (Tractatus, 2.221).

Sense of a proposition depicts or represents the picture of a situation and that situation must agree with the reality to claim the proposition as true. Here, the question arises if it is so then what about false proposition? Do we hold the view that false proposition represents a false picture and hence the false picture of a proposition is contentless? Furthermore, since false propositions do not describe any situation or state of affairs should we say that all false propositions make no sense?

Wittgenstein replies to this question by introducing a new concept called 'possible situation' where he makes a link between the possible situation and the existence and non-existence state of affairs of the world. The existent state of affairs is a positive fact whereas the non-existent state of affairs is a negative fact. In his words, the existence and non-existent state of affairs of the world is reality (Tractatus, 2.06). For him, state of affairs is atomic because it corresponds to the elementary proposition. Therefore, elementary propositions are also atomic. Elementary propositions cannot be divided further in to more basic propositions. They deal with objects of the world directly. In a similar fashion state of affairs of the world cannot be reduced to any further basic state of affairs of the world.

Names are the constituent parts of an elementary proposition. All names refer to the objects of the world. Since elementary propositions assert the existence of state of affairs, they correspond to the objects of the world. This is so because all the state of affairs consists of objects only. Hence, all propositions have truth-value. Therefore, Wittgenstein states that every proposition is essentially either true or false. If the proposition corresponds to the fact that it describes then the proposition is judged as true. On the contrary, if the proposition does not correspond to the fact it is judged as false. So truth or falsity of a proposition is determined from the sense of a proposition. Sense is logically embedded with the proposition. Thus every sentence has a sense, i.e. what it expresses.