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Now, if we assume that effort is the only factors of production involved then total cost, TC, will be equal to the level of effort multiplied by the prices of effort (W). If the wage rate (W) is assumed to be constant then TC = WE 3. Also if the price of the harvested product is constant at P, then total revenue (TR) from the harvest will be TR = PH 4. Since P and W are assumed constant the total revenue curve will have the same shape as the effort harvest function in fig: (4) the total cost function with a constant slope equal to the wage rate or “price per unit effort” is shown in fig: (5).
Fig: 5(a) profit maximum
Fig: 5(b) marginal conditions
Now, for profit maximization producer requires :
1) maximum to the difference between TR and TC or
2) slope equate marginal revenue (MR) with marginal cost (MC) and the MC must have a steeper slope than MR curve or MC must cut MR from below (shown in fig 5b).
Under the profit maximization hypothesis two possible equilibrium are possible (shown fig 6).
- Common property equilibrium.
- Open access equilibrium.
A common property equilibrium or resource is one that is owned by some defined group of people a community or a nation. It is possible that within this group of people there will be open access and it is harvested.
An open access equilibrium or property means that no one owns the resources
and access is open to all. There are no limit on new entrants (e.g. sea
fisheries).

Fig: 6 Profit maximization and open access equilibrium
If the renewable resources can be placed under single ownership or joint ownership in such a way that the owners’ act collectively, we can assume that the resources will be managed to maximise profit. In the fig: (5a) and (6);
A is the point of maximum profit with
H PROF = Hπ = as the harvest rate
Eπ = as the effort rate
However private ownership is not typical or applicable for all the resources e.g. major forest or sea fishes. Instead we may have either territorial ownership or no territorial ownership (Internationally common property). In either case we get the ‘Open access solution’.
Here, if less than normal profit are being made (TR<TC) some resource exploiters will go out of business and if abnormal profit (TR>TC) are being earned new entrants will come in. At equilibrium profits point are dissipated (TR =TC) and each resources exploiter recurs normal profit only. In fig: (6) equilibrium is at point B with a harvest rate HOA and effort rate EOA equal.
From the two-equilibrium solution it can be said that the profit maximization solution can only be optimal in the social sense if the preference of conservation imply zero ‘preservation value’ for the resource. In order to get socially optimal solution we try to accommodate externalities in our analysis. For example, if conservationists prefer larger to smaller stocks their utility loss will be a function the difference between the maximum possible stock (the natural equilibrium or carrying capacity stock) and the actual stock that results from the amount resources use.
UC = f (Xmax – XE)
Where UC = the loss of utility of the conservationists & XE = the various equilibrium levels of stock.
The valuation function consistent with this function is shown in fig: 7. How ever we should remember that depending upon the ‘reference point’ (here X max) the valuation function may differ (e.g. if we take X MSY the reference point or most desired point). Now it is most likely that at very low levels of stock the preservation value function will be discontinuous.
From the above discussion we can conclude that the addition of externalities in the normal situation following things happens.
- When the aim is to maximise net benefit in contrast to simple profit maximization the optimal stock of the resource will be higher.
- If the external costs are very large the resources will be ‘optimally’ managed if it is left alone to reach its natural equilibrium.
- Introduction of social cost also does not confer any particular emphasis on the social desirability of the stock levels corresponding to MSY.
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