A question is raised here, how is it possible to bring together the constituent words a thought, which bring a new thought conveying more than the parts of a sentence convey?
Frege resolves this problem by analyzing the 'compositionality principle'. The compositionality principle states that grasping a thought requires grasping of each concept which occurs as a part within that thought. He writes that "if we look upon thoughts as composed of simple parts and take these in turn to correspond to the simple parts of sentences, we can understand how a few parts of sentences can go to makeup a great multitude of sentences to which in turn their correspond a great multitude of thoughts."13 In a similar fashion, the sense of a proposition is determined by combining the meaning of its constituent parts through which the sentence is made up. He has also given an alternative by stating that a given thought can be constructed as a value of a certain conceptual function for certain conceptual arguments. He calls this model "function/argument model".14 Since thoughts are complex structured, they are to be understood with certain conceptual functions and in addition to it some vivid arguments. In this connection, Wittgenstein writes, "whenever there is a complexity, functions and arguments are present" (Wittgenstein, 1972, 5.47).
Continuing with his argument, Frege holds that the time of utterance is the part of the expression of the thought. For example, 'today' is the thought to have the sense of 'the present day', whereas 'yesterday' could be thought to have the sense of 'the day before'. Thus, sense of a proposition does not move from context to references, but directly to references. As a result, we can move easily from sense to reference. Hence, we are able to get the truth-value of all the propositions.
Further, Frege argues that mere wording is not the complete expression of thought. The knowledge of certain accompanying conditions of utterances is needed for its correct apprehension, such as, in the case like pointing of fingers, hand movements, bodily gestures. It is so because the same utterance containing the word 'I' will express different thoughts in diverse contexts by different speakers who uttered 'I' at different times. Out of those one event may be true for someone but that may not be true for others.15 For example, suppose a union president says "I demand that…." and a prisoner says "I did not do that….". In these two sentences the difference lies when the first one expresses about the demand of the people as a whole, the second one expresses completely a view of an individual. Some may disagree to accept that the first sentence is of the view of the group of people. They may suggest that it is completely a view of an individual but not as a whole. In this way, the uttered 'I' has different thoughts in relation to different speakers in the contextual variations.
| 13 | Frege, G. (1984). Compound Thoughts. In Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy, ed. by B. McGuinness and translated by M. Black, Oxford: Blackwell Publication, p.390. See Frege, G. (1977). Logical Investigations. In P.T.Geach (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publication, p.55. |
| 14 | Bell,D. (1996). The Formation of Concepts and the Structure of Thoughts, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56, p.595. |
| 15 | Frege, G. (1977). Logical Investigations. In P.T. Geach (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publication, p.1. |