If ideas need a bearer then question arises, who is the bearer of my idea as 'myself'? The answer given by Frege is, 'I am' the idea of 'myself'. Here, I have an idea of myself but I am not identical with this idea.9 So the content of my consciousness is 'my idea' which could be sharply distinguished from what is an object of my thought on 'myself'. It will be clear if we explain this by the help of an analogy. In a strict and logical sense, I can see others as in the form of objects, but I cannot see myself as an object. Frege asserts that I may see myself by gathering the impressions which I could get from the mirror. Thus, ideas need a bearer and without bearer ideas have no existence. It is just like if there is no ruler, there are no subjects.
On Frege's account, ideas are the power of thought and immediate objects of apperception. At the same time ideas correspond to the apprehension of thought. In thinking we do not produce thoughts but we apprehend them. When there is an idea, it is an idea of someone. It belongs to someone and is known to someone. On the contrary, a thought is transmitted from one generation to another. Thus, ideas are subjective and personal whereas thoughts are objective and eternal. In this regard, Frege argues that senses of expressions are unlike ideas on the ground that a particular sense, which an individual attaches to his or her words, can be grasped by others. But in the case of ideas it is not possible. Thus, he says that two speakers attach the same sense to their respective expressions only if they know that their expressions have the same referent. 10
| 9 | Frege, G. (1977). Logical Investigation. In P.T. Geach, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publication, p.22. |
| 10 | Here, the term ‘sense’ is used logically by replacing the term ‘thought’. The term ‘sense’ and ‘thought’ are interchangeable, because both are synonymously used in Fregean context. |