The objective of this presentation is to give an overall view of the theories of meaning and theories of truth. There is a dominant tradition found in semantics, which explains meaning largely in terms of truth and truth conditions. To know the meaning of a sentence is to know the referent that the sentence is stating about. It enunciates that meaning of a proposition is understood independently of other propositions of a language. The reason is that a sentence is self-sufficient and self-evident for determining its meaning.

The above argument forms the core of a thesis on 'meaning' that has dominated the semantic tradition since Frege. In this connection, we shall discuss some of the important theories of this tradition offered by Frege, and Early Wittgenstein. Both of them subscribe to the theory 'meaning atomism', which states that to know the meaning of a sentence is to know the referent(s) of the sentence. The sentence will be judged as true if the referent (that the sentence is stating about) is found in the empirical world, otherwise it will be judged as false.