Investigation of 'meaning' is not a recent concern in philosophy. Traditionally, philosophers have been interested in the question of 'meaning'. This is evident from the work of Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Hume, and Kant, to name a few. But their interests in the study of 'meaning' have never been central to philosophical inquiry. As a result, many scholars like Russell, Carnap, Ayer, Waismann, Schlick, and others propounded their theories of meaning in their times. However, all of their theories took a radical turn, a turn towards language which is commonly characterized as linguistic turn in philosophy. It is evident from a cursory look at the development of philosophy that language becomes an independent subject of study. We are thus no longer surprised when scholars offered philosophical theories in the form of linguistic proposals. Gilbert Ryle goes to an extent of saying that "philosophical arguments have always, if not entirely, consisted in attempts to thrash out 'what it means to say so and so'" (Rorty, 1967, 85). The concern for meaning and the correct characterization of the nature of meaning thus become the foremost concern of contemporary philosophy of language.

Philosophers' occupation with 'meaning' is characterized by such general questions like: 'What is meaning?', 'How is meaning determined?', 'How do expressions acquire meanings?', etc. True, these are general questions but they cannot be answered in general terms. These questions cannot be answered independently of any perspective. There are semantic perspectives in the light of which meaning is characterized. This allows the possibility of alternative characterizations of meaning structure or semantic structure of natural language. As a result, a new domain called 'philosophy of language' emerged.