The Duhem-Quine view of theory thus does not provide support to the notion of analyticity that positivist theory of epistemology requires. The reason is, it is not the sentence but the language that matters in deciding truth. There is a clear break from the atomistic view of language to the holistic view of language. Accordingly, the Carnapian distinction between the cognitive and the practical or between the internal questions and the external questions do not find any place in this holistic picture of language. There is nothing like linguistic choice and cognitive choice to be conceived separately. All choices involved are both linguistic and cognitive. There is no epistemological vantage point on which to ground analytic/synthetic distinction.

However, Quine's critique of verificationism has a problem. In spite of its strength and boldness, it is incomplete as a critique to establish that meaning works holistically. Quine's critique lacks substantial arguments stating why verificationism is wrong. It claims that verificationism is wrong because it presupposes a wrong view regarding the relationship between language and the world. One can very well challenge this and may point out that Quine's claim that sentences do not face experience individually but as a corporate body is unfounded. We do not simply see such an event happening. What will be Quine's reply to this? In constructive terms, we need to know first, where exactly the verificationist account of meaning breaks down. Second, is there any good reason that compels us to reject verificationism as a theory of meaning? And, third, what is the crucial aspect in a theory construction that cannot be accounted for in verificationist theory of meaning? In this respect, Quine's thesis on the indeterminacy of translation can be of enormous help. It completes the argument that Quine started in his critique on verificationism. It provides answers to the three questions raised above. It may not be inappropriate to say that one of the interpretations of the indeterminacy thesis is to show that verificationist account of meaning fails epistemologically. With this, we may now come to the indeterminacy thesis which constitutes the third layer of argument in Quine's proposal on meaning holism.