Two Dogmas: The Second Layer Argument
With atomistic picture of language we may now come to Quine's critique of verificationst theory of meaning through which he shows how meaning works holistically. Verificationism is an account according to which the meaning of a sentence is the method of empirically confirming or disconfirming it. Analytic sentences are of course kept separately since they are confirmed 'no matter what' or 'come what may'. This may be viewed as another way- a procedure through which analytic/synthetic distinction can be ascertained via verificationist theory of meaning. A sentence will be called analytic if it is confirmed no matter what. Otherwise, the sentence will be synthetic. This way of arguing will make sense only if we accept verificationist account of meaning to be correct. The basic thrust of Quine's critique is to show that verificationist theory of meaning is wrong. It is wrong not on any other ground, such as, circularity. It is wrong because the account of meaning that it offers is false.
Verificationism has its root in reductionism of the earlier positivist work, such as, the Aufbau project of Carnap.3 True, verificationism does not subscribe to radical reductionism but, nevertheless, it assumes in its account of meaning a subtler form of reductionist thesis. The reason is, Quine points out, verificationism holds the following theses: First, for each synthetic statement there corresponds a set of possible sensory events, and second, occurrence of any one of them will establish the truth or falsity of the sentence concerned. From this Quine concludes that verificationism retains reductionist element because it shares with reductionism that each statement is confirmed or disconfirmed in isolation from other sentences. Verificationism in this sense embraces reductionism.
| 3 | Carnap, R. (1947). Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. |