This asserts that while going through all the assumptions and their verification, we come to know most of the axioms of the Telugu language and hence we can derive the theorems of meaning theory for Telugu which are nothing but the T-sentences of Telugu language.

Now a question arises: how do we know that the T-sentences or the meaning theorems are true? An answer may be given that one has to relate the truth theory to actual linguistic practice of the native speaker. This creates another problem, i.e., how can we do so? How can we provide empirical content to the truth theory to make it sensitive to the practices of the native speaker? This question arises because we find the native speakers try to relate empirical evidences in their linguistic practices. Further, a question may be raised: is the truth theory that once related to our linguistic practice can act like a meaning theory?

To know that a theory is correct is to know either (a) the axioms of the theory are correct by being empirically testified or (b) each of the derivations of the theory, i.e., the T-sentences are testified by experience and are thus true. Davidson does not show his inclination towards the first alternative because it may lead to the atomistic theory of meaning where each sentence is self-sufficient for determining its truth-value. If he had suggested this theory for determining the truth-value of a sentence, his theory wouldn't be considered as a satisfactory one for determining the truth-value of the sentences of natural language. Thus, he preferred the second alternative where we have to ascertain the deliverances of the theory, i.e., the T-sentences are true or are corroborated by the actual linguistic practice of the native speaker. In order to find out the truth of a T-sentence we have to find out whether all the other T-sentences following from the theory are true or not, and are being corroborated by linguistic practice. This inevitably leads to meaning holism. It states that the only way in which we may know the meaning of a sentence is by knowing the true T-sentence of it. But to know the T-sentence we have to know all other T-sentences that follow from the theory are true, i.e., the meaning of all other T-sentences have to be known. We cannot know the meaning of any sentence in isolation from other sentences. Thus, to know the meaning of a sentence we have to know the meaning of all other sentences of a language within a particular paradigm.

This analysis raises an issue, i.e., how are we going to know that the theory yields consequences which are corroborated by the linguistic practice of the native speaker? We have to find out whether the native speaker does take the T-sentence in question to be the meaning-specifying sentence. That means, does it specify the meaning of the sentence whose meaning we are trying to find out? What we are trying to do is to give a correct interpretation of the bit of linguistic behavior of the native speaker. And the interpretation of the bit of linguistic behavior may be seen as a re-description of the following kind:

From: Susama has uttered the sentence 'Varsha heuchhi'
To: Susama has said that it is raining

Now the question is, what do we need to know if we are to be in a position to re-describe the utterance in this way? We have to know:

The circumstance of the utterance of the sentence 'Varsha heuchhi' by Susama, i.e., we have to find out that it is indeed raining.
It is in the circumstance of rain that Susama makes the utterance 'Varsha heuchhi'.
Susama as a rule maker of the utterance 'Varsha heuchhi' utters in the circumstance of rain, and all native speakers of Odiya language in such a circumstance utter or assent to the sentence 'Varsha heuchhi'. (And this should be established strongly enough to be able to handle counterfactuals like: Someone who is not a native speaker of Odiya would have given assent to 'Varsha heuchhi' in the circumstance of rain.)

In this regard, a crucial issue for Davidson is to find out the rational grounds on the basis of which we can decide the indefinite T-theories that are extensionally adequate representations of a language L and it is to be identified as the correct meaning theory for the language L.

Along with his theory of interpretation Davidson introduces the notion 'radical interpretation' which has two functions.⁵

It must specify the kinds of empirical evidence that a successful meaning theory is required to account for.
Since different ways of constraining the evidence will lead to different T-theories, a radical interpretation theory must justify the imposition of one set of evidential constraints in preference to others.

⁵	These two features have been borrowed from Fordor, J, and Lepore, E. (Eds.). (1992). Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Oxford: Blackwell, p.71.