To appreciate the novelty of Feyerabend's approach to scientific practice, we must juxtapose his views with those of positivists, Popper and Kuhn. First, as we have seen, both positivists and Popper maintain the thesis of methodological monism – there is only one method for science irrespective of its subject matter. Since this method is supposed to be adopted well by natural sciences, social sciences are advised to follow natural sciences. Even Kuhn implicitly maintains that social sciences can achieve progress only by following natural sciences whose distinctive mark, according to him, is their success in developing a normal tradition. Against the methodological monism, many social scientists argue that social sciences need to have a method different from that of natural sciences thanks to the peculiar subject matter of their study. Thus, an influential school of thought which went by the name of Verstehen School that dominated social sciences, in general, and, German scene of social sciences, in particular maintain what is called methodological dualism. The Verstehen School contended that the aim of natural sciences was “explanation” and that of social sciences “understanding”, with the result their methods radically differ from each other. However, the Verstehen School conceded to its opponents that there is something called the method of natural sciences. Feyerabend's rejection of methodological monism is more radical than that of methodological dualists since he repudiates the very idea that there is something called “the” method in natural sciences. According to Feyerabend's methodological pluralism, neither natural sciences nor social sciences have “one” method.

Secondly, by pleading for proliferation of theories and the need for pluralism, Feyerabend stands against Kuhn who virtually celebrates that fact that in natural sciences there is a qualitatively greater consensus than in social sciences. According to Feyerabend, even if Kuhn is right in his description of the actual scientific practice, he is not justified in thinking that the monolithic state of affairs is the ideal. In other words, rejecting Kuhn's idea of paradigmatic stage as the ultimate phase of scientific evolution, Feyerabend advocates the need for post-paradigmatic stage in which scientific practice is characterized by plurality.