Does Feyerabend mean that our new theories should not have any empirical basis? No. All that he says is that we must not insist that our theories must have empirical basis the very moment they are generated. They must be allowed to develop their empirical basis instead of being nipped in the end for the sole reason that existing theories and known facts do not support them. In this connection, he discusses in detail the case of Galileo. We all know that Galileo sought to replace the geocentric theory of Ptolemy by the heliocentric theory of Copernicus. It must be mentioned that most of the known facts were in harmony with the Ptolemaic theory. Of course, there were many observations which prima facie were against the Ptolemaic theory. But, the followers of Ptolemy can yet to take care of such recalcitrant facts by making suitable adjustments in their theory. In sum, going by the well-established observations and known facts, the Ptolemaic theory had definitely an edge over the Copernican theory. Hence, Galileo rightly did not try to get support from already known facts for the Copernican view. Instead, he tried to come out with new observations using telescope. But, Galileo's rival questioned the legitimacy of extending the use of telescope observations from terrestrial to the celestial sphere. Galileo, as we have seen, could have answered his opponents by propounding a theory of light which would justify telescopic observations. Galileo similarly required many such auxiliary theories to justify the new facts which he enlisted in support of the Copernican theory. Galileo's rivals, on the one hand, were no doubt right in demanding them. But, on the other, Galileo was convinced that these auxiliary theories could be developed once the Copernican theory passes through on the basis of however slender and yet-to-be substantiated observational evidence so that the new theory could build for itself enormous amount of empirical basis in terms of new observations. Once the new theory stands on its own feet, the old observations and facts which were taken to support the Ptolemaic theory came to be interpreted in the light of the new theory. If Galileo had taken the correspondence condition seriously and endeavoured to enlist the support of the known facts, he would not have been able to bring about the revolution which he did. Thus, it is not that observations come first is the theory which subsequently develops an observational basis for itself. Marx recognizes this when he says, ‘Science, unlike other architects, builds not only castles in the air, but may construct separate habitable storey of the building before laying the foundation stone'².

Notes and References

² Karl Marx, A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy , Progress Publishers, Moscow , 1970, p. 57.............