How does Popper establish the objectivity of scientific knowledge? Inductivists sought to establish the objectivity of science by showing that scientific theories are based upon pure observations. The so-called pure observations were supposed to be absolutely theory-free. They are only “given” and hence free from the subjective inferences. Popper, as we have seen, rightly rejects the idea of pure observations. Consequently, he cannot accept the inductivist account of the objectivity of science. First, what engenders scientific objectivity according to Popper is not the possibility of pure observation, but the possibility of inter-subjective testing. In short, science is objective because it is public, and it is public because its claims are inter-subjectively testable. Secondly, Popper makes room for relative autonomy of facts or observations. That is to say, whereas inductivists considered observations to be “absolutely” theory-free, Popper construes them to be “relatively” theory-free. He maintains that though an observation must depend upon some theory, it can be independent of the theory which is tested in terms of it. Hence, a theory depends upon (rejected or tentatively accepted) a prior observation, which in turn, needs ratification in terms of a theory prior to it. To the question, “which comes first, observation or theory?”, the inductivist answers “observation”. Popper answers earlier observation or earlier theory. To Popper, the question is as illegitimate as the question “which comes first, egg or hen” that can be only answered by saying “earlier egg or earlier hen”.