Another serious lacuna in Popper's position concerns his idea of scientific progress. The progress of science is continuous in the sense that in two successive theories the latter contains the former or the best part of it. The continuity of scientific progress is exemplified by the fact that between two successive theories, the former is always the limiting case of the latter. In this connection, Popper cites the example of Newtonian theory and Einsteinean theory. But, Popper first overlooks the fact that in the actual history of science, such comparables are rare. For example, it is assured to say that Phlogiston Chemistry is the limiting case of Oxygen theory or Polemic theory is the limiting case of Copernican theory. Secondly, Popper's idea that our successive theories exhibit increasing degree of Verisimilitude is more like what our present theory says than what our earlier theory indicated. It implies, following Popper we must say, that the ultimate constituents of matter are more like fields (as contemporary physical theory indicates) than particular (as classical physics indicated). But, this is slightly unintelligible. In short, we are led into unintelligibility, if we literally apply Popper's characterization of two successive theories to the very cases he takes to be paradigmatic. Finally, in characterizing the old theory as an approximation to the new one, Popper assumes that the general locations of the new theory imply the same things as in the old one. That is to say, Popper assumes that when a fundamental shift in theory takes place, the meaning of the terms remain invariant. This assumption has been called into question by some philosophers of science who show that the terms like “mass”, “force”, etc. have one meaning in Newtonian framework and another in the post-Newtonian framework. Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, whose views we explicate below, have convincingly argued that a shift from one theory to another is accompanied by a shift in the meaning of the works that are common to both the theories. If so, Popper's characterization of growth of science, as continuous, collapses.

Questions
1.   What is the central question of philosophy, according to Popper?
2.   What is the problem of cosmology?
3.   What is systematic falsifiability?
4.   What do you mean by hypothetico-deductive explanation?
5.   What is context of discovery?
6.   What is context of justification?
7.   What do you mean by conjecture?
8. What are the procedures of Karl Popper's method of scientific explanation? How are they different from positivistic method of scientific explanation?
9. Write a note on ‘logic of scientific discovery'.