This brings a clear division between pragmatic, on the one side, and cognitive on the other. Within these two broad divisions analytic claims and factual or synthetic claims are situated. These are two primary modes through which respective claims are grounded. The one is grounded in the linguistic framework and other is grounded in the world. As a result, the two claims acquire two different epistemological statuses. In the former case, since the choice of linguistic framework is non-cognitive, the claims grounded in such a framework cannot be other than being cognitively contentless. This explains the non- refutable character of these claims by experience. High-level scientific and mathematical claims belong to this category. In contrast to this are the claims belonging to the latter category being grounded in the world of facts and experience. Their epistemological status is thus defined in the light of empirical and not pragmatic considerations. The distinction between the pragmatic and the cognitive corresponds to Carnap's1 distinction between external and internal questions. The former involve choice of linguistic framework whereas the latter are concerned with the things that are falling within a physical framework. These internal questions are therefore "empirical scientific" questions which make true or false assertions about the world.
The above discussion shows that language-epistemology nexus of positivism gives rise to a particular form of foundationalism. Classification of sentences into analytic understood as contentless and synthetic understood as factual implies that they have different epistemological status. 'Analytic' and 'synthetic' are the two fundamental notions which provide the foundation for a theory of knowledge. It is a theory in which epistemology is seen as logical reconstruction of scientific theories. Against the backdrop of this positivist's idea of language-epistemology nexus, Quine's meaning holism with all its components that necessarily includes the critique of analytic-synthetic distinction and the verificationist theory of meaning is to be understood. As stated earlier Quine's meaning holism assumes three level structure of argument which will be presented in the next three following sections.
| 1 | Hornstein, N. (1982). Foundationalism and Quine's Indeterminacy of Translation Thesis, Social Research. In my presentation of Indeterminacy thesis, I have followed some of the arguments of N. Hormstein. |