The picture of a proposition is same as the sense of a proposition, and also it is same with the thought of a proposition. On this occasion, Wittgenstein viewed that "a logical picture of facts is a thought" (Tractatus, 3). In a proposition thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses (Tractatus, 3.1). In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought (Tractatus, 3.2). The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world (Tractatus, 3.01). A state of affairs is thinkable; what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves (Tractatus, 3.001). Thought can be expressed through language. It is the picture which makes a link between thought and language. A picture becomes meaningful as it is incorporated into the intentional situation. Thus it is viewed that a picture is a model of reality (Tractatus, 2.12). Picture of a proposition cannot be separated from the content and context of a proposition. It is so because by the help of content picture gets its life. A question is raised here, what is that a proposition represents if it is a picture? Wittgenstein viewed that a proposition represents a situation or a state of affairs when it is a picture. From this we can assert whether a proposition is to be called either true or false. A proposition is to be judged as true when the picture of a proposition correctly matches with the state of affairs of the world and it turns out to be false if it does not correctly match with the state of affairs of the world. Thus, Wittgenstein eloquently expresses that a person understands a proposition means he or she knows what is the case if it is true.
In this connection, Wittgenstein shows the difference between meaning of a name and meaning of a proposition. A name does not have meaning if it does not correspond to object. This is so because meaning of a name is the object it names. On the contrary, there are cases where propositions have meaning but they do not correspond to any state of affairs of the world. Thus Wittgenstein stated that "names have meaning and the propositions have sense." 3
| 3 | For more details please see Wittgenstein, L. (1979). Notebooks 1914-1916, p.94. |