Wittgenstein attacks the calculus model of language but holds the chess analogy as useful medium to explain the determination of meaning of a proposition. In this regard, it may be pointed out that he rejects the reductionist's view by stating that a proposition won't be reduced to either a set of propositions or to an atomic proposition which is conclusively verifiable by reference to what is immediately given in experience. This suggests that he rejects the foundationalism in epistemology. His way of explaining the foundationalism revolves around the socialized epistemology instead of naturalized epistemology. On this account, he agrees that language learning rests upon training and further, language acquisition presupposes neither thought nor innate knowledge. On his view, language learning is a heuristic device to illuminate the concepts of language, meaning and understanding. Hence, "the common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" (PI, $206).