In continuation to the previous presentation, we shall discuss what is the significance of the 'theory of interpretation' in the context of theory of meaning? Attempting to answer this question Davidson iterates that the aim of the 'theory of interpretation' is to interpret the language of other speakers and in addition to it he assumes that an interpreter is one who seeks to understand what other speakers mean when they utter something. Adding further, he conveys that it is necessary for an interpreter to identify the conditions under which a speaker holds true occasion sentences by judging his/her beliefs.

In an interpretative theory regarding the issue concerning how communication takes place between the hearer and the speaker Davidson says that it becomes possible only when it satisfies the following features or requirements.⁷

1. To have a belief, one must have the concept of a belief.
2. To have the concept of a belief, one must have the concept of error or equivalently of objective truth.
3. The claim that a being has the concept of objective truth stands in need of grounding, in particular, there must be scope for the application of the concept in the being's experience.

There are three conditions of interpretation through which we can understand the role and significance of interpretation in the construction of a theory of truth empirically. They are:

1. Both interpreter and the speaker belong to the same speech community
2. None of them must not pretend in their utterances
3. Both of them must share a system of common beliefs

The first one states that if the utterances of a speaker are based on his/her attitudes then we face the problem of equally eligible rival interpretations. This leads to the failure of developing a single theory of interpretation. But the Davidson's claim is that to interpret a particular utterance we necessarily require a single theory of interpretation which will be comprehensive enough, so that the theory can interpret infinite number of utterances (Dasgupta, 1999, 308). The main focus here is on the notion of evidence. For a theory to be comprehensive it is to be assumed that the evidence for interpretation does not change. Thus Davidson claims that the evidence for the interpretation of a particular sentence will be same for the interpretation of all utterances of a speaker or community at large. This is the reason why Davidson introduces the notion of speech community which implies speaker belonging to the same language have the same linguistic repertoire. By virtue of this speakers of the same language mean the same thing by their utterances.

The second condition of interpretation suggests that it is an essential assumption for all the speakers belonging to the same speech community that they share a similar pattern of intention. This implies one need not pretend to others while conveying something. If they do then the problem remains as the native speaker and the interpreter fail to share their language with each other. This conveys the message that we must have a coherent interpretation. The third condition emphasizes the need for possessing a common system of beliefs between the speakers and the interpreters. Davidson calls it 'shareability of belief'.

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7	These two issues have borrowed from Ludwig, K. (1999). Theories of Meaning, Truth and Interpretation. In U.M. Zeglen,U.M (Ed.), Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge. London: Routledge, p.43.