Science ,Technology and Society

Longino contrasts the cognitive virtues proposed by mainstream theorists with an alternative set of feminist theoretical virtues. The former list includes internal consistency, external consistency, simplicity, breadth of scope, and fruitfulness. To this list, Longino counterpoises feminist virtues: novelty, ontological heterogeneity, mutuality of interaction, applicability to current human needs, and diffusion of power; the last two are designated "pragmatic" virtues. One additional item, empirical adequacy, is found on both lists: A scientific theory that accurately predicts facts is better than one that fails to do so. Longino contends that regardless of the bundle of virtues proposed, these virtues "require further interpretation to be applied in a given research context, they are not simultaneously maximally satisfiable, and they are not subject to hierarchical ordering or algorithmic application" ( Cognitive , 49).

She intends the theroretical virtues to be virtues of theories, not of individual scientists. They should be thought of as explicating how a valuable scientific theory is to be characterized. By labeling these virtues “feminist”, Longino does not mean that they are more likely to be valued by women qua women, nor by women qua marginal members of the scientific community. Rather, the idea is this: "If the context is gendered (in the sense of being structured by gendered power asymmetries), inquiry guided by these virtues is more likely to reveal it or less likely to preserve its invisibility than the traditional virtues" ( Cognitive , 50).