Sl.No | Chapter Name | MP4 Download |
---|---|---|
1 | Module 1 : Introduction: Game Theory | Download |
2 | Module 2: Introduction: Mechanism Design | Download |
3 | Module 3: The game of chess | Download |
4 | Module 4: Proof of the chess theorem | Download |
5 | Module 5: Normal form games | Download |
6 | Module 6: Dominance | Download |
7 | Module 7: Nash equilibrium | Download |
8 | Module 8: Maxmin strategies | Download |
9 | Module 9: Elimination of dominated strategies | Download |
10 | Module 10: Preservation of PSNE | Download |
11 | Module 11: Matrix games | Download |
12 | Module 12: Relation between Maxmin and PSNE in matrix | Download |
13 | Module 13: Mixed strategies | Download |
14 | Module 14: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) | Download |
15 | Module 15: Find MSNE | Download |
16 | Module 16: MSNE characterization theorem proof | Download |
17 | Module 17: Algorithm to find MSNE | Download |
18 | Module 18: Correlated equilibrium (CE) | Download |
19 | Module 19: Computing correlated equilibrium | Download |
20 | Module 20: Extensive form games | Download |
21 | Module 21: Subgame perfection | Download |
22 | Module 22: Limitations of SPNE | Download |
23 | Module 23 : Imperfect Information Extensive Form Games (IIEFG) | Download |
24 | Module 24 : Strategies in IIEFGs | Download |
25 | Module 25 : Equivalence of Strategies in IIEFGs | Download |
26 | Module 26: Perfect Recall | Download |
27 | Module 27: Equilibrium in IIEFG | Download |
28 | Module 28: Game Theory in Practice: P2P file sharing | Download |
29 | Module 29: Bayesian Games | Download |
30 | Module 30: Strategy, Utility in Bayesian Games | Download |
31 | Module 31: Equilibrium in Bayesian Games | Download |
32 | Module 32: Examples of Bayesian Equilibrium | Download |
33 | Module 33: Introduction to Mechanism Design | Download |
34 | Module 34: Revelation Principle | Download |
35 | Module 35: Introduction to Arrow's Impossibility Result | Download |
36 | Module 36: Proof of Arrow's Result | Download |
37 | Module 37: Introduction to the Social Choice Setup | Download |
38 | Module 38: Introduction to Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem | Download |
39 | Module 39: Proof of Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem | Download |
40 | Module 40: Domain Restriction | Download |
41 | Module 41: Median Voting Rule | Download |
42 | Module 42: Median Voter Theorem - Part 1 | Download |
43 | Module 43: Median Voter Theorem - Part 2 | Download |
44 | Module 44: The Task Sharing Domain | Download |
45 | Module 45: The Uniform Rule | Download |
46 | Module 46: Mechanism Design with Transfers | Download |
47 | Module 47: Examples of Quasi-linear Preferences | Download |
48 | Module 48: Pareto Optimality and Groves Payments | Download |
49 | Module 49: Introduction to VCG Mechanism | Download |
50 | Module 50: VCG in Combinatorial Allocations | Download |
51 | Module 51: Applications to Internet Advertising | Download |
52 | Module 52: Slot Allocation and Payments in Position | Download |
53 | Module 53: Pros and Cons of VCG Mechanism | Download |
54 | Module 54: Affine Maximizers | Download |
55 | Module 55: Single Object Allocation | Download |
56 | Module 56: Myerson's Lemma | Download |
57 | Module 57: Illustration of Myerson's Lemma | Download |
58 | Module 58: Optimal Mechanism Design | Download |
59 | Module 59: Single Agent Optimal Mechanism Design | Download |
60 | Module 60: Multiple Agent Optimal Mechanism Design | Download |
61 | Module 61: Examples of Optimal Mechanisms | Download |
62 | Module 62: Endnotes and Summary | Download |
Sl.No | Chapter Name | English |
---|---|---|
1 | Module 1 : Introduction: Game Theory | PDF unavailable |
2 | Module 2: Introduction: Mechanism Design | PDF unavailable |
3 | Module 3: The game of chess | PDF unavailable |
4 | Module 4: Proof of the chess theorem | PDF unavailable |
5 | Module 5: Normal form games | PDF unavailable |
6 | Module 6: Dominance | PDF unavailable |
7 | Module 7: Nash equilibrium | PDF unavailable |
8 | Module 8: Maxmin strategies | PDF unavailable |
9 | Module 9: Elimination of dominated strategies | PDF unavailable |
10 | Module 10: Preservation of PSNE | PDF unavailable |
11 | Module 11: Matrix games | PDF unavailable |
12 | Module 12: Relation between Maxmin and PSNE in matrix | PDF unavailable |
13 | Module 13: Mixed strategies | PDF unavailable |
14 | Module 14: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) | PDF unavailable |
15 | Module 15: Find MSNE | PDF unavailable |
16 | Module 16: MSNE characterization theorem proof | PDF unavailable |
17 | Module 17: Algorithm to find MSNE | PDF unavailable |
18 | Module 18: Correlated equilibrium (CE) | PDF unavailable |
19 | Module 19: Computing correlated equilibrium | PDF unavailable |
20 | Module 20: Extensive form games | PDF unavailable |
21 | Module 21: Subgame perfection | PDF unavailable |
22 | Module 22: Limitations of SPNE | PDF unavailable |
23 | Module 23 : Imperfect Information Extensive Form Games (IIEFG) | PDF unavailable |
24 | Module 24 : Strategies in IIEFGs | PDF unavailable |
25 | Module 25 : Equivalence of Strategies in IIEFGs | PDF unavailable |
26 | Module 26: Perfect Recall | PDF unavailable |
27 | Module 27: Equilibrium in IIEFG | PDF unavailable |
28 | Module 28: Game Theory in Practice: P2P file sharing | PDF unavailable |
29 | Module 29: Bayesian Games | PDF unavailable |
30 | Module 30: Strategy, Utility in Bayesian Games | PDF unavailable |
31 | Module 31: Equilibrium in Bayesian Games | PDF unavailable |
32 | Module 32: Examples of Bayesian Equilibrium | PDF unavailable |
33 | Module 33: Introduction to Mechanism Design | PDF unavailable |
34 | Module 34: Revelation Principle | PDF unavailable |
35 | Module 35: Introduction to Arrow's Impossibility Result | PDF unavailable |
36 | Module 36: Proof of Arrow's Result | PDF unavailable |
37 | Module 37: Introduction to the Social Choice Setup | PDF unavailable |
38 | Module 38: Introduction to Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem | PDF unavailable |
39 | Module 39: Proof of Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem | PDF unavailable |
40 | Module 40: Domain Restriction | PDF unavailable |
41 | Module 41: Median Voting Rule | PDF unavailable |
42 | Module 42: Median Voter Theorem - Part 1 | PDF unavailable |
43 | Module 43: Median Voter Theorem - Part 2 | PDF unavailable |
44 | Module 44: The Task Sharing Domain | PDF unavailable |
45 | Module 45: The Uniform Rule | PDF unavailable |
46 | Module 46: Mechanism Design with Transfers | PDF unavailable |
47 | Module 47: Examples of Quasi-linear Preferences | PDF unavailable |
48 | Module 48: Pareto Optimality and Groves Payments | PDF unavailable |
49 | Module 49: Introduction to VCG Mechanism | PDF unavailable |
50 | Module 50: VCG in Combinatorial Allocations | PDF unavailable |
51 | Module 51: Applications to Internet Advertising | PDF unavailable |
52 | Module 52: Slot Allocation and Payments in Position | PDF unavailable |
53 | Module 53: Pros and Cons of VCG Mechanism | PDF unavailable |
54 | Module 54: Affine Maximizers | PDF unavailable |
55 | Module 55: Single Object Allocation | PDF unavailable |
56 | Module 56: Myerson's Lemma | PDF unavailable |
57 | Module 57: Illustration of Myerson's Lemma | PDF unavailable |
58 | Module 58: Optimal Mechanism Design | PDF unavailable |
59 | Module 59: Single Agent Optimal Mechanism Design | PDF unavailable |
60 | Module 60: Multiple Agent Optimal Mechanism Design | PDF unavailable |
61 | Module 61: Examples of Optimal Mechanisms | PDF unavailable |
62 | Module 62: Endnotes and Summary | PDF unavailable |
Sl.No | Language | Book link |
---|---|---|
1 | English | Not Available |
2 | Bengali | Not Available |
3 | Gujarati | Not Available |
4 | Hindi | Not Available |
5 | Kannada | Not Available |
6 | Malayalam | Not Available |
7 | Marathi | Not Available |
8 | Tamil | Not Available |
9 | Telugu | Not Available |