Modules / Lectures


Sl.No Chapter Name MP4 Download
1Module 1 : Introduction: Game TheoryDownload
2Module 2: Introduction: Mechanism DesignDownload
3Module 3: The game of chessDownload
4Module 4: Proof of the chess theoremDownload
5Module 5: Normal form gamesDownload
6Module 6: DominanceDownload
7Module 7: Nash equilibriumDownload
8Module 8: Maxmin strategiesDownload
9Module 9: Elimination of dominated strategiesDownload
10Module 10: Preservation of PSNEDownload
11Module 11: Matrix gamesDownload
12Module 12: Relation between Maxmin and PSNE in matrixDownload
13Module 13: Mixed strategiesDownload
14Module 14: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE)Download
15Module 15: Find MSNEDownload
16Module 16: MSNE characterization theorem proofDownload
17Module 17: Algorithm to find MSNEDownload
18Module 18: Correlated equilibrium (CE)Download
19Module 19: Computing correlated equilibriumDownload
20Module 20: Extensive form gamesDownload
21Module 21: Subgame perfectionDownload
22Module 22: Limitations of SPNEDownload
23Module 23 : Imperfect Information Extensive Form Games (IIEFG)Download
24Module 24 : Strategies in IIEFGsDownload
25Module 25 : Equivalence of Strategies in IIEFGsDownload
26Module 26: Perfect RecallDownload
27Module 27: Equilibrium in IIEFGDownload
28Module 28: Game Theory in Practice: P2P file sharingDownload
29Module 29: Bayesian GamesDownload
30Module 30: Strategy, Utility in Bayesian GamesDownload
31Module 31: Equilibrium in Bayesian GamesDownload
32Module 32: Examples of Bayesian EquilibriumDownload
33Module 33: Introduction to Mechanism DesignDownload
34Module 34: Revelation PrincipleDownload
35Module 35: Introduction to Arrow's Impossibility ResultDownload
36Module 36: Proof of Arrow's ResultDownload
37Module 37: Introduction to the Social Choice SetupDownload
38Module 38: Introduction to Gibbard-Satterthwaite TheoremDownload
39Module 39: Proof of Gibbard-Satterthwaite TheoremDownload
40Module 40: Domain RestrictionDownload
41Module 41: Median Voting RuleDownload
42Module 42: Median Voter Theorem - Part 1Download
43Module 43: Median Voter Theorem - Part 2Download
44Module 44: The Task Sharing DomainDownload
45Module 45: The Uniform RuleDownload
46Module 46: Mechanism Design with TransfersDownload
47Module 47: Examples of Quasi-linear PreferencesDownload
48Module 48: Pareto Optimality and Groves PaymentsDownload
49Module 49: Introduction to VCG MechanismDownload
50Module 50: VCG in Combinatorial AllocationsDownload
51Module 51: Applications to Internet AdvertisingDownload
52Module 52: Slot Allocation and Payments in PositionDownload
53Module 53: Pros and Cons of VCG MechanismDownload
54Module 54: Affine MaximizersDownload
55Module 55: Single Object AllocationDownload
56Module 56: Myerson's LemmaDownload
57Module 57: Illustration of Myerson's LemmaDownload
58Module 58: Optimal Mechanism DesignDownload
59Module 59: Single Agent Optimal Mechanism DesignDownload
60Module 60: Multiple Agent Optimal Mechanism DesignDownload
61Module 61: Examples of Optimal MechanismsDownload
62Module 62: Endnotes and SummaryDownload

Sl.No Chapter Name English
1Module 1 : Introduction: Game TheoryPDF unavailable
2Module 2: Introduction: Mechanism DesignPDF unavailable
3Module 3: The game of chessPDF unavailable
4Module 4: Proof of the chess theoremPDF unavailable
5Module 5: Normal form gamesPDF unavailable
6Module 6: DominancePDF unavailable
7Module 7: Nash equilibriumPDF unavailable
8Module 8: Maxmin strategiesPDF unavailable
9Module 9: Elimination of dominated strategiesPDF unavailable
10Module 10: Preservation of PSNEPDF unavailable
11Module 11: Matrix gamesPDF unavailable
12Module 12: Relation between Maxmin and PSNE in matrixPDF unavailable
13Module 13: Mixed strategiesPDF unavailable
14Module 14: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE)PDF unavailable
15Module 15: Find MSNEPDF unavailable
16Module 16: MSNE characterization theorem proofPDF unavailable
17Module 17: Algorithm to find MSNEPDF unavailable
18Module 18: Correlated equilibrium (CE)PDF unavailable
19Module 19: Computing correlated equilibriumPDF unavailable
20Module 20: Extensive form gamesPDF unavailable
21Module 21: Subgame perfectionPDF unavailable
22Module 22: Limitations of SPNEPDF unavailable
23Module 23 : Imperfect Information Extensive Form Games (IIEFG)PDF unavailable
24Module 24 : Strategies in IIEFGsPDF unavailable
25Module 25 : Equivalence of Strategies in IIEFGsPDF unavailable
26Module 26: Perfect RecallPDF unavailable
27Module 27: Equilibrium in IIEFGPDF unavailable
28Module 28: Game Theory in Practice: P2P file sharingPDF unavailable
29Module 29: Bayesian GamesPDF unavailable
30Module 30: Strategy, Utility in Bayesian GamesPDF unavailable
31Module 31: Equilibrium in Bayesian GamesPDF unavailable
32Module 32: Examples of Bayesian EquilibriumPDF unavailable
33Module 33: Introduction to Mechanism DesignPDF unavailable
34Module 34: Revelation PrinciplePDF unavailable
35Module 35: Introduction to Arrow's Impossibility ResultPDF unavailable
36Module 36: Proof of Arrow's ResultPDF unavailable
37Module 37: Introduction to the Social Choice SetupPDF unavailable
38Module 38: Introduction to Gibbard-Satterthwaite TheoremPDF unavailable
39Module 39: Proof of Gibbard-Satterthwaite TheoremPDF unavailable
40Module 40: Domain RestrictionPDF unavailable
41Module 41: Median Voting RulePDF unavailable
42Module 42: Median Voter Theorem - Part 1PDF unavailable
43Module 43: Median Voter Theorem - Part 2PDF unavailable
44Module 44: The Task Sharing DomainPDF unavailable
45Module 45: The Uniform RulePDF unavailable
46Module 46: Mechanism Design with TransfersPDF unavailable
47Module 47: Examples of Quasi-linear PreferencesPDF unavailable
48Module 48: Pareto Optimality and Groves PaymentsPDF unavailable
49Module 49: Introduction to VCG MechanismPDF unavailable
50Module 50: VCG in Combinatorial AllocationsPDF unavailable
51Module 51: Applications to Internet AdvertisingPDF unavailable
52Module 52: Slot Allocation and Payments in PositionPDF unavailable
53Module 53: Pros and Cons of VCG MechanismPDF unavailable
54Module 54: Affine MaximizersPDF unavailable
55Module 55: Single Object AllocationPDF unavailable
56Module 56: Myerson's LemmaPDF unavailable
57Module 57: Illustration of Myerson's LemmaPDF unavailable
58Module 58: Optimal Mechanism DesignPDF unavailable
59Module 59: Single Agent Optimal Mechanism DesignPDF unavailable
60Module 60: Multiple Agent Optimal Mechanism DesignPDF unavailable
61Module 61: Examples of Optimal MechanismsPDF unavailable
62Module 62: Endnotes and SummaryPDF unavailable


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2BengaliNot Available
3GujaratiNot Available
4HindiNot Available
5KannadaNot Available
6MalayalamNot Available
7MarathiNot Available
8TamilNot Available
9TeluguNot Available