

## Module 4: "Static games of incomplete information"

### Lecture 28: "Auctions"

#### The Lecture Contains:

Static games of incomplete information: Application: Auctions

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Static games of incomplete information: Application: Auctions

- Auction is an example of static game with incomplete information
- Auction involves a simultaneous move game where players simultaneously submit their bids to win the item put up for auction.
- It is a game of incomplete information as each bidder does not know the exact valuation of all the other bidders for the subject put up for auction.
  - hence payoff functions of rivals are not known to the players



Auctions	
First price Auction	Second price Auction
Highest bidder wins, pays the highest bid & gets the object. Loser pays nothing & gets nothing.	Highest bidder wins, pays the second highest bid & gets the object. Loser pays nothing & gets nothing.

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**First Price Sealed Bid Auction**

- Payoff by winning = Valuation - Bid  
Payoff by losing = 0
- Important features :  
Players always underbid (i.e. bid less than their valuation of the object).
  - nobody will bid more than what the good is worth
    - even if one wins, one is worse off and gets a negative payoff.
  - If one bids the exact valuation.
    - even if he/she wins, payoff=0
- Hence one always bid less than what one values
- Trade off in deciding the bid amount
  - Lower the bid, the greater the payoff if one wins
  - Higher the bid, greater the chance of winning
- Optimal bid strategy is taken keeping this trade off in mind.

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**Second Price Auction**

- This type of auction is used on e-Bay
- Here bidder bids the exact valuation.

Consider the following example

Bidder	Amount Bid
Sachin	₹ 100
Sourav	₹ 90
Rahul	₹ 30

Here Sachin wins the auction and pays ₹ 90

Suppose the good in auction is worth 100 to Sachin.

Sachin will always bid ₹ 100 if a second price auction is used.

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Bidding ₹ 100 Vs bidding some amount less than ₹ 100

Comparing bidding ₹ 100 versus ₹ 99 (say)

- If the highest bid  $> ₹ 100$ 
  - Does not matter, whether you bid 99 or 100 – lose in both cases
- If the highest bid other than Sachin's  $< ₹ 99$ 
  - Does not matter again
  - in both cases, Sachin wins and pays the second highest bid.
- If the highest bid other than that of Sachin is between ₹ 99 & ₹ 100 - say ₹ 99.50
  - If Sachin bids 100
    - Sachin wins & gets the good and payoff  
 $= 100 - 99.5 = 0.5 > 0$
  - If Sachin bids 99
    - Sachin loses and payoff=0
    - Hence in this case, Sachin is better off by bidding ₹ 100

Hence Sachin is either as well off or better off by bidding ₹ 100 than by bidding something less than ₹ 100

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Bidding ₹ 100 versus bidding something more than ₹ 100

Bidding ₹ 100 versus ₹ 105 (Say)

- If somebody else bids more than ₹ 105
  - Then Sachin will lose in both cases
- If the highest bid other than Sachin's is less than 100.
  - then Sachin wins in both cases and pays the second highest bid- so payoff is same by bidding ₹ 100 as well as by bidding ₹ 105
- If the highest bid other than that of Sachin is between 100 and 105, say at ₹ 104
  - Payoff to Sachin by bidding ₹ 105
    - Sachin wins the auction and payoff =  $100 - 104 = -4$
  - Payoff to Sachin by bidding ₹ 100
    - Sachin loses the auction and Payoff=0
  - Hence in this case, Sachin is better off by bidding ₹ 100

Hence to sum up, in Second price auction, Sachin will always be either better off or stay as well off by bidding ₹ 100 ( his exact valuation) then by bidding anything else.

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