

Module 3: "Dynamic games of complete information"

Lecture 15: "Dynamic Games; Different Examples"

The Lecture Contains:

- Dynamic Game: Different Examples
- Game I
- Game II
- Game III
- Sequential rationality

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
Dynamic Game: Different Examples

- Pepsi & Coke War
 - Coke is contemplating about whether to enter a new market dominated by its rival, Pepsi

Game I:

- Pepsi can either act tough (T).
 - i.e. mounts a big advertising campaign, upgrades facilities
- Or Pepsi can accommodate (A)
 - i.e. does not take any aggressive measures like advertising etc.

Game tree I




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Game II

- After Pepsi's decision coke has a further decision
 - It can either mount an advertising campaign and act tough (T)
 - Or it can accommodate (A)

Game tree II




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Game III

- Should coke enter the market, then both coke and Pepsi decide about whether to act tough or accommodate
- Decisions are taken simultaneously

Game tree III



Remember, when a player is not aware of the decision node by the rival, then the concerned player has an information set.

- Here Coke is not sure about Pepsi's action (T or A) and hence it has an information set consisting of two nodes.

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Sequential rationality

- Decision maker at a decision node will pick the best available action given what he in turn believes about the remaining future of the game
- All the dynamic games are solved on the basis of sequential rationality.

Normal form version of Game I

		Pepsi	
		T	A
Coke	Enter	-2, -1	1, 2
	Out	0, 5	0, 5

Two NE \rightarrow (Enter, A)

(Out, T)

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Sequential rationality rules out

(Out, Tough)

- (Out, Tough) is an unreasonable Nash equilibrium
- This equilibrium says that Pepsi undertakes to fight Coke (or act Tough) if Coke were to enter the market.
- However if Coke enters the market, then Pepsi is better off by playing A (look at game tree)
- Pepsi is giving a **threat** to Coke that if Coke enters, Pepsi will act tough (T)
- Threat is not credible
 - Pepsi gets worse off by carrying out the threat
- So (Out, Tough) is not sequentially rational

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