Lecture 38

Cartesian Theory of Mind Revisited

 

Moreover, when Descartes makes the distinction between mind and body, he did not say that the idea of the mind is that of a ghost, although he did say that the idea of body is that of a machine. Ryle in his book, ‘The Concept of Mind’ says that Descartes’s distinction between mind and body is a myth. He argues, “I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as ‘the dogma of the ghost in the machine’. I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle.”11 According to Ryle, Descartes’s distinction between mind and body commits a category-mistake.

As Ryle said, “my destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category mistake is the source of the double-life theory. The representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine derives from this argument. Because, as is true, a person’s thinking, feeling and purposive doing cannot be described solely in the idioms of physics, chemistry and physiology, therefore they must be described in counterpart idioms. As the human body is a complex organized unit, so the human mind must be another complex organized unit, though one made of a different sort of stuff and with a different sort of structure. Or, again, as the human body like any other parcel of matter, is a field of causes and effects, so the mind must be another field of causes and effects, though not (Heaven be praised) mechanical causes and effects.”12

11 Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, 1978, Penguin Books Ltd., Middlesex, England, p.17.

12 Ibid., Pp.19-20.