Biological naturalism does not allow any sort of reduction from mind to brain. According to this theory the mental states are not the same as the brain states. Of course, there is a duality involved in the understanding of reality. It is because the physical is causing the mental reality. The ontological problem must be resolved by the micro level and macro level descriptions. What is specific about the irreducibility of consciousness? For Searle, "the point of argument is ontological not epistemic."⁸ Philosophers who have tried to reduce the mental to the physical have emphasized the epistemic aspects of the reality. For them, it is the epistemic aspect that can explain the objectivity of the mental states. The objectivity of knowledge must be grounded in the third-person point of view. In this connection, the objectivity of various features of conscious mental states can be determined by studying the neurophysiolgoical processes of the brain. And this is possible only through scientific observation. On the other hand, the person's feeling and sensations cannot be determined by the third persons' point of view. That is because when a person is having a good feeling he is experiencing joy at that moment. The objectivity of that person’s joy can only be felt by the person himself who is experiencing it. No doubt it embodies certain neurological process but what is important to note for defining the person's conscious feeling is his subjective experience. This is purely a macro level description of the mental life. The moment we try to reduce the subjective conscious experience of sensation or feeling to the neurological processes of the brain, we will fall into the trap of ontological reductionism. Thus he says, "The first person feeling is important. This fact has obvious epistemic consequence: My knowledge that I am in pain has a different sort of basis than my knowledge that you are in pain. But the antireductionistic point of the argument is ontological and not epistemic."⁹ Searle's antireductionism tries to establish the notion that subjectivity or first person experience of the mental phenomena is grounded in the ontology of brain processes. The ontology must be correlated with consciousness, because subjectivity of mental states is basically related with the conscious states and feelings of the mental life.